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INTRODUCTION
A guy walks into a bar. It’s a dingy neighborhood bar replete
with a pool table, unattractive stained glass windows, aging
barflies and a cranky bartender. “Hiya Homer,” the bartender
grumbles. This greeting is echoed by a corpulent, toad-like bar
regular named Barney who punctuates it with a seismic belch.
Welcome to Moe’s Tavern. Location: Springfield, the fictional
setting of the long-running television series, The Simpsons.
In between dispensing questionable advice, falling victim to a
series of crank phone calls, pointing a shotgun at patrons and
indulging in the occasional get-rich-quick scheme, Moe serves
Duff, the local beer. Duff enjoys an enviable market position in
Springfield, the apparent result of an aggressive marketing
campaign. Duff’s empire includes its several labels (Duff, Duff
Dry, Duff Lite, Duff Dark, Raspberry Duff, Tartar Control Duff);
Duff Gardens, a theme park; Duff Man, a flamboyant spokesman
with a cape and a beer-toting belt and even a spokes-shark named
Duff McShark. Duff advertises on television and in print (Moe’s
Tavern is positively plastered with advertising for the beer) and
gives tours of its brewery. The beer sports a logo, instantly
recognizable to fans of the show and to the residents of Springfield
alike, featuring elongated black lettering against a red, white and
tan background.
Duff’s brand is characterized by crass marketing and less-thanstringent production standards.1 Even the name connotes qualities
few would seek out in a beer or with which they would wish to be
associated.2 Here in the real world, “most consumers know the
fictional drink is a parody of the kind of mass-produced beer found

1
In one episode of The Simpsons, “Duffless,” Homer visits the Duff brewery where
an inspector removes bottles of Duff from an assembly line containing a rat, a syringe
and a human nose. On this trip, it is also revealed that Duff, Duff Dry and Duff Lite are
all the same beer. The Simpsons: Duffless (Fox television broadcast Feb. 18, 1993).
2
See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451,
465 (Austl.) (“The word [Duff] is used in relation to golf to refer to striking a ball
clumsily or failing to play a shot. The word ‘duffer,’ which is perhaps more relevant,
connotes a plodding, stupid or incompetent person.”); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 553 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that “duff” is a slang
term for “buttocks”), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/duff.
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throughout the U.S.”3 Because of Duff’s fame on The Simpsons,
however, those same qualities which suggest the shoddiness of the
beer in the fictional world of Springfield have created a sizeable
market for a Duff Beer here in the real world.
Enter Rodrigo Contreras. A “marketing man” who has “always
had an eye for a gimmick,”4 Mr. Contreras is the owner of
Simpson’s Brewing Company, a Tijuana-based brewery
manufacturing his own Duff Beer5 whose label is “practically the
same as the design on the cans in the cartoon.”6 Contreras stresses
that the brewery’s name “is a coincidence.”7 Because he concedes
that the idea to manufacture Duff Beer occurred to him while
watching an episode of The Simpsons in 2002,8 however, that
assertion may strike some as difficult to swallow. Contreras
presently sells in Mexico and Europe but aims to expand into the
United States as well.9 While Fox would not comment on any
legal action it may or may not be contemplating against Simpson’s
Brewing Company when interviewed about Contreras’ Duff Beer
in December 2009, it simply stated that “The Simpsons is a
Twentieth Century Fox property, and Fox owns the rights to The
Simpsons universe. We intend to protect our rights.”10 This is
almost certainly a credible threat. In 1996, Fox won a preliminary
injunction against two Australian breweries for manufacturing a
product called “Duff Beer”11 and the company has initiated
lawsuits against several other breweries around the world seeking
to manufacture their very own Duff Beer without a license from
Fox.12 If Fox’s saber rattling is any indication, courts will likely
3

Homer Simpson’s Beer Bubbles to Life, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/81d13ac8-e03e-11de-8494-00144feab49a.html?.
4
Id.
5
Cerveza Duff de Mexico, DUFF INC., http://www.duffdemexico.com (last visited May
20, 2010).
6
Homer Simpson’s Beer Bubbles to Life, supra note 3.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 452
(Austl.); see infra Part II.A.2.
12
Eriq Gardner, Why Hasn’t Fox Sued the Makers of Duff Beer?, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Dec. 7, 2009, 2:06 AM), http://thresq.hollywoodreporter.com/2009/12/fox-
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soon have occasion to revisit the issue of real-life protection for
fictional trademarks. But when they do, what harm could Fox
allege?
Because Duff is a trademark, albeit a fictional one, a natural
first impulse would be to look to trademark law. This body of law
seeks to reward producers who, like the fictional Duff, make
efforts to build a strong brand. Indeed, assuming that United
States federal law applies in the fictional world of Springfield,
Duff has an easy case against a rival fictional manufacturer calling
itself Duff and manufacturing beer, or even shoes. But what
happens when a real manufacturer attempts the same thing? Can
trademark (or some other form of intellectual property protection)
furnish a remedy for the creator of a fictional mark when a realworld user trades on the good will of the mark by recreating the
fictional product in the real world? Or put another way, can a realworld producer get away with manufacturing Duff Beer?
This Note argues that it cannot. Two federal courts in the
United States and Australia who have adjudged the issue agree,
finding that such conduct constitutes a trademark injury. However,
the appropriation of a fictional mark is no ordinary trademark
injury. Because Duff is a creative aspect of a fictional work, the
courts could have plausibly concluded that its appropriation is
actually copyright infringement. Indeed, Fox appears to suffer two
different injuries depending on one’s perspective.
From inside Springfield (what this Note will call the “internal
perspective”), when a second comer markets a beer called “Duff,”
we appear to have a classic trademark injury: a latter market
entrant or “junior user” trading on the good will built up by the
senior user of the mark.13 But things look very different outside

duff-beer-trademark.html; see also S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 457 (noting that
“Fox has consistently refused to grant licenses to parties who have sought to use ‘The
Simpsons’ in connection with alcohol and tobacco products, or other substances
considered detrimental to children”).
13
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006); see also Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
186 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.01[1] (4th ed. 1996)) (defining senior user
and junior user as the first and second seller, respectively, to adopt and use a trademark in
the United States).

C04_ARROW_011111_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FICTIONAL TRADEMARKS

1/11/2011 4:07 PM

115

Springfield. From our perspective here in the real world (which
this Note will call the “external perspective”), Duff Brewery does
not exist at all. Instead, Duff Beer is part of a rich, fictional
universe and preventing the unauthorized duplication of the
expressive aspects of that world seems more properly to be the
domain of copyright law. Both of these areas of intellectual
property law have intuitive appeal but both pose doctrinal hurdles
fictional marks may not be able to surmount. For a symbol to be a
viable trademark it must be used in commerce to distinguish the
seller’s goods from goods made by others, but to say that Duff
Beer has been used in commerce is literally to indulge in fiction.
Similarly, while copyright law protects original expression as soon
as that expression is fixed in a tangible medium, under its de
minimis doctrine, copyright does not protect “words and short
phrases.”14 As Homer Simpson would say, “D’oh!”
The reasoning of the few courts to consider fictional trademark
injuries is in many ways instructive in understanding the puzzle
posed by fictional trademarks. But the courts ultimately paper
over the tug between perspectives and doctrines, hinting at a role
copyright might play while locating the injury under traditional
trademark law. As a result, it remains unclear analytically, if not
legally, what harm Fox suffers when Contreras sells his Duff Beer
and whether existing trademark or copyright doctrine, standing
alone, provides a remedy.
This Note proposes a doctrinal approach to cloaking deserving
fictional trademarks with intellectual property protection. Part I
describes the legal contours of relevant trademark and copyright
law. Part II.A considers the fictional trademark problem as a
trademark injury and presents two cases which have viewed it as
such; Part II.B considers the possibility that a fictional trademark
injury is actually a copyright injury in disguise and points to
aspects of those two cases in which the courts appear to talk
trademark but walk copyright. Part III locates the injury under
traditional trademark law but adapts the trademark analysis to the
particulars of the fictional trademark problem—in part, by
incorporating relevant analytical principles from copyright. This
14

37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2010).
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Note then discusses how the two cases would come out under this
tailored trademark framework and analyzes a few other fictional
trademark scenarios.
I. THE DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE
A. Trademark
Trademarks are governed by both state common law and
federal statutory law. The Lanham Act of 1946,15 a federal statute,
affords qualifying marks nationwide protection upon registration.16
Unregistered marks are protected by state common law and are
subject to more geographically limited protection.17
The term “trademark,” as defined in the Lanham Act, “includes
any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof . . .
used by a person, or . . . which a person has a bona fide intention to
use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by [the Lanham] Act, to identify and distinguish his or
her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.”18 As the Supreme Court has explained, the
“‘requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a
trademark’ are that it be (1) a ‘symbol,’ (2) ‘use[d] . . . as a mark,’
(3) ‘to identify and distinguish the seller’s goods from goods made
or sold by others,’ but that it not be ‘functional.’”19
Trademark law is bottomed on a consumer protection rationale.
As the Supreme Court has explained,

15

Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
17
See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 19:1–9 (4th ed. 2010).
18
15 U.S.C. § 1127. Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office, the federal registrar
of trademarks, have construed the word “symbol” broadly and “authorized for use as a
mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC’s three
chimes) and even a particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread).” Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
19
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166 (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.01[1], at 3-2, § 7.26, at 7-113 (3d ed. 1994)).
16
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In principle, trademark law, by preventing others
from copying a source-identifying mark, reduces
the customer’s costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions for it quickly and easily
assures a potential customer that this item—the item
with the mark—is made by the same producer as
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or
disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law
helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputationrelated rewards associated with a desirable product.
The law thereby encourages the production of
quality products and simultaneously discourages
those who hope to sell inferior products by
capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to
evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.20
Thus, to the extent that trademark law seeks to disincentivize
an “imitating competitor” from reaping “financial” and
“reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product,”
this goal is subservient to the ultimate aim of protecting consumers
by preventing confusion in the marketplace.21 Accordingly,
trademark law looks favorably upon efforts such as those
employed by the fictional Duff to create and promote a strong,
distinctive mark and provides a relatively low threshold to
establish rights in a mark.22 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
provides a cause of action against the user of a mark in commerce
whose use “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship or
20
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64 (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
21
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64.
22
See id. at 162 (“The language of the Lanham Act describes [the universe of things
that can qualify as a trademark] in the broadest of terms. It says that trademarks
“includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof.”). Compare
15 U.S.C. § 1127, with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (requiring that a product be novel, useful,
non-obvious and sufficiently described by the applicant in such a way as to enable others
to make and use the invention to receive patent protection).
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approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person.”23
Because of its focus on preventing marketplace confusion,
trademark law favors marks which are distinctive and thus easily
recognizable by consumers. In assessing distinctiveness “[c]ourts
and commentators have traditionally divided potential trademarks
into four categories. A potential trademark may be categorized as
(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbitrary or
fanciful.”24 A generic term is “the name of a particular genus or
class of which an individual article or service is but a member”25
and “if at any time a mark becomes generic as to a particular
product or service, the mark’s registration is subject to
cancellation.”26 Examples of marks which have become generic
A descriptive term
include Aspirin27 and Murphy Bed.28
“identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service.”29
Descriptive terms are not protectable as marks in their descriptive
sense, that is, when they describe the products with which they are
associated. They may, however, become distinctive “by acquiring
a secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public,”30 that
is, “when in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a
product feature . . . is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself.”31 Chap Stick32 and Instant Messenger33
are descriptive marks. A suggestive mark “suggests, rather than
describes, some particular characteristic of the goods or services to
which it applies and requires the consumer to exercise the

23

Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983).
25
Id.
26
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
27
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
28
Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989).
29
Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 790 (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115
(5th Cir. 1979)).
30
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
31
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (quoting Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982)).
32
Morton Mfg. Corp. v. Delland Corp., 166 F.2d 191 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
33
In re Am. Online Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1618 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (concluding that
petitioner’s mark, “Instant Messenger,” was “registrable on the Principal Register
because it has acquired distinctiveness under . . . the Trademark Act”).
24
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imagination in order to draw a conclusion as to the nature of the
goods and services.”34 The term “Coppertone” as applied to suntanning products has been held to be suggestive.35 Arbitrary or
fanciful marks “bear no relationship to the products or services to
which they are applied.”36 Kodak37 and Exxon38 are fanciful
marks. Suggestive marks and arbitrary or fanciful marks are
considered to be inherently distinctive without proof of secondary
meaning.39
Trademark law requires not only that a mark be sufficiently
distinctive, but that it have established priority in a given
marketplace. This body of law thus follows the ancient maxim
“first in time, first in right” with the first user of an inherently
distinctive mark having priority over latter users and the first
descriptive mark to acquire secondary meaning having priority
over other such marks.40 “Only active use” of a mark in commerce
“allows consumers to associate a mark with particular goods and
notifies other firms that the mark is so associated.”41 Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit explained that the purpose of
the rule is to “reward[] those who act quickly in getting new
products in the hands of consumers.”42 Indeed, as Professors
Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis note, “[a]bsent consumers
coming to associate a mark with a particular source, there would be
no reason to confer trademark rights on a particular trader.”43
Thus, the use in commerce requirement, far from being a mere
procedural formality, limits protection to marks which consumers
have come to identify with a given source or producer.

34

Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791 (internal citations omitted).
Id.; see Douglas Labs. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954).
36
Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791.
37
Id.; see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930); see also
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
38
Exxon Corp. v. XOIL Energy Res., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
39
Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791.
40
2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
16:1 (4th ed. 2010).
41
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
42
Id. at 504.
43
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1612 (2007).
35
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The issue of whether a use of a mark is sufficient to constitute
a use in commerce is made “on a case by case basis” and turns on
“the totality of the circumstances.”44 Unsurprisingly then, it is not
clear whether use in a work of fiction is sufficient to reserve
priority rights in a mark here in the real world.
Many elements of fictional works are protectable under
trademark law. For example, in In re DC Comics,45 a seminal case
on modern trademark interpretation, the court held that a graphic
character can function as a protectable mark.46 In that case, DC
Comics appealed from a decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) refusing
trademark registration for drawings of three of DC’s comic book
characters which appeared on the packaging for action figures of
those characters.47 TTAB reasoned that the drawings were “so
descriptive” of the figures within that they were “not
trademarks.”48 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the
Federal Circuit) reversed. That court reasoned that:
[w]hatever information a drawing of Superman or
Batman or Joker might convey to the average
prospective purchaser regarding a doll resembling
one of the related fictional characters is wholly
dependent on appellant’s efforts to associate each
character in the public’s awareness with numerous
attributes, including a single source of
sponsorship.49
The court thus concluded that the “information-conveying
aspect of the drawing” did not “conclusively eliminate its possible
trademark role” finding instead that DC’s efforts to link the
characters and the brand in the public mind were the critical factor
which enabled the fictional characters to serve as trademarks.50
44

Johnny Blastoff, Inc., v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1999);
see also New W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979).
45
689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
46
Id. at 1045.
47
Id. at 1043.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1044.
50
Id.
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Similarly, other prominent elements of fictional works have
been held to constitute independent trademarks. For example, in
DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates,51 DC Comics, again in
the role of plaintiff, sued an animation studio which created
television shows for it and others. Proceeding on a trademark
infringement theory, DC alleged that Filmation’s series Manta and
Moray and Superstretch infringed trademarks in the characters
Aquaman and Plastic Man which starred in DC’s cartoon series.52
The court found for DC, holding that:
[w]here the product sold by plaintiff is
“entertainment” in one form or another, then not
only the advertising of the product but also an
ingredient of the product itself can amount to a
trademark protectable under § 43(a) [of the Lanham
Act] because the ingredient can come to symbolize
the plaintiff or its product in the public mind.53
The court noted that protectable ingredients included “the
names and nicknames of entertainment characters, as well as their
physical appearances and costumes” but did not include a fictional
character’s “physical abilities or personality traits” since these
were capable of “an infinite number of possible visible and audible
manifestations” and thus lacked the “consistency of
representation” required for a mark to serve as a reliable indicator
of source in the public mind.54
Similarly, in DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp.,55 the court found
the fictional element “Kryptonite” from DC’s Superman series to
be “an element associated with Superman entertainment products”
and thus entitled to trademark protection.56 Notably, in its defense,
Kryptonite argued that DC Comics, by featuring Kryptonite in the
Superman story “for narrative” and as a “fictitious substance to
enhance the story” had “never used the mark in commerce . . . to

51
52
53
54
55
56

486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 1277.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
336 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 332.
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identify or designate the source of a real product or service.”57 The
court rejected this argument, finding that “[a]s a result of broad
dissemination throughout all media, the fictional element
Kryptonite, including its graphic depiction, has come to be
recognized as a powerful symbol, and is immediately recognized
or associated with the character Superman.”58 The Kryptonite
court thus seemed to hold that use of a fictional mark within a
work of fiction, without more, may be sufficient to reserve priority
in the mark. However, it is unclear if the court would have
reached the same result without DC having also licensed
Kryptonite to appear on merchandise.
Beyond whether or not the mark has been used in commerce,
the principal constraint on the establishment of trademark rights is
the extent to which such use has occurred. The extent of the use
sufficient to reserve priority rights in a mark varies depending on
whether or not the mark is registered.59 While common law
requires “substantial sales” to put other firms on notice that a given
mark is already associated with a source of goods, “[r]egistration
[of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office]
modifies this system slightly, allowing slight sales plus notice in
the register to substitute for substantial sales without notice.”60 In
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal S.A.,61 the Seventh Circuit explained that
this system “prevents entrepreneurs from reserving brand names in
order to make their rivals’ marketing more costly” and lets “others

57

Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
59
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
60
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006)). The requirement that a mark be used in
commerce before it can be registered was relaxed somewhat with the passage of the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1989 (“TLRA”) Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935,
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051. Under the TLRA, the creator of a mark who has “a bona
fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use [the]
trademark in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal
register.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). This intent-to-use registration still requires that a bona
fide use in commerce take place within six months (extendable up to three years for good
cause shown) of the issuance of an approval (a “notice of allowance”) by the Patent and
Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2). Failure to use the mark in commerce within
this period results in abandonment of the application. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(4).
61
979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992).
58
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know that they should not invest resources to develop a mark
similar to one already used in the trade.”62
In addition to serving as indicators of source, trademarks
communicate the experiential and psychological qualities of a
given product. Professor McCarthy states that “each product goes
to market with a ‘psychic load’ of intangible and non-utilitarian
psychological factors” and argues that the communication of such
experiential information to consumers “must be recognized when
considering the legal issues of ‘likelihood of confusion’ and
‘dilution’ of the effect of a given trademark.”63 Thus, an important
aspect of trademark law is its protection of the economic value of
consumers’ positive psychological reaction to a firm and its
trademark known as the firm’s “good will.”64 Trademark law,
then, protects not just the consumer, but “the businessman who has
gained a strategic advantage through building up of good will,
against unfair practices by competitors who desire to poach on this
good will.”65 With the advent of modern branding, trademarks
have taken on lives of their own, becoming objects of consumer
adoration even independent of any particular products with which
they may be associated.66 Good will has thus become a valuable
intellectual property asset in its own right; the estimated value of
Coca-Cola’s trademark, for example, independent of any of its
tangible assets is estimated to be approximately $24 billion.67

62

Id. at 503.
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
2:37 (4th ed. 2010).
64
Id. § 2:17.
65
Id. § 2:17 (quoting E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.
1943)).
66
See generally Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960
(1993).
67
Legislation: Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws, 44
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 585, 586 (1992); see also Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54
Emory L.J. 461, 461 (2005) (“Trademark merchandising is big business. One marketing
consultant estimated the global market for licensing and marketing sports-related
merchandise at $17 billion in 2001. The college-logo retail market was estimated at $3
billion in 2003. The 2002 Salt Lake Olympics generated $500 million in gross sales—
and $34 million in licensing revenues—from sale of ‘Olympics’ attire.”) (internal
citations omitted).
63
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In addition to protecting trademarks which are inherently
distinctive or which have acquired secondary meaning, the
Lanham Act also protects a product’s trade dress, that is, “the total
image of a business.”68 Trade dress is protectable upon the same
basis as trademarks; inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable
absent a showing of secondary meaning.69
In order to make out a cause of action for trademark
infringement a plaintiff must establish that:
 It has a valid mark that is entitled to protection
under the Lanham Act; and that
 The defendant used the mark,
 In commerce
 In connection with the sale . . . or advertising of
goods or services
 Without the plaintiff’s consent70
and that such use ‘“is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of [the defendant] with [the
plaintiff], or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the
defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by [the
plaintiff].”71
There are thus two discreet “use in commerce” analyses in
trademark law: one for the senior user to determine if its use
suffices to establish priority rights in a mark, and one for the junior
user to determine if its use infringes. These are quite separate and
distinct. While the priority analysis requires slight sales plus
registration or more significant sales in the absence of registration,
many significant uses by a junior user will be considered “fair
uses” such that they employ the senior user’s mark without
infringing the senior user’s trademark rights. Such fair uses

68

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1 (1992).
See id. at 774 (noting that “[p]rotection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks,
serves the Act’s purpose to ‘secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers’”).
70
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
71
1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)).
69
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include the senior user’s mark having become generic,72 the senior
user’s abandonment of its mark,73 and “nominative” fair uses such
as descriptive use (including comparative advertising or news
reporting), parody and free speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.74 Indeed, as Professors Dinwoodie and Janis note, “a
teleological analysis of trademark law would suggest that the
concept of use sufficient to establish rights might differ radically
from the type of use by a defendant that might give rise to
infringement.”75 Thus, while courts and commentators differ as to
what constitutes a “use in commerce” for infringement purposes,76
section 45 of the Lanham Act makes clear that, for purposes of the
priority analysis, “[t]he term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona

72
See, e.g., The Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 97 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that the term “Murphy bed” is “a generic term, having been
appropriated by the public to designate generally a type of bed”).
73
See, e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F.
Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the baseball team “the Brooklyn Dodgers” had
abandoned trademark rights in its name upon moving to Los Angeles such that a junior
user’s restaurant entitled “The Brooklyn Dodger” was a noninfringing use).
74
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
that the defendant’s song “Barbie Girl” was a noninfringing parody of plaintiff Mattel’s
doll of the same name); see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26,
29 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized
use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view.”).
75
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 43, at 1613.
76
Compare Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1673–74 (2007) (arguing that abolishing the
requirement that a trademark be used “as a mark” in order to infringe would “severely
limit a whole host of legitimate but unauthorized uses of [a trademark holder’s mark]
particularly (but not exclusively) in the online context”) with Dinwoodie & Janis, supra
note 43, at 1603 (arguing that “limiting liability to trademark use, as that term is
understood by its proponents, will . . . result in insufficient marketplace regulation”).
Similarly, courts are split with regard to the issue of whether use in public discourse to
“sell” a political message constitutes a use in commerce under the infringement analysis.
Compare Lucasfilm v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing
complaint of petitioner Lucasfilm alleging that public interest groups’ use of the phrase
“star wars” to persuade the public of their respective viewpoints of the Reagan
Administration’s strategic defense initiative through television messages constituted
trademark infringement) with United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am. N.Y.,
Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997) (“‘use in commerce’ denotes Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause rather than an intent to limit the Act’s application
to profitmaking activity.”).
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fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark.”77
While the tests for likelihood of confusion employed by the
different federal circuit courts of appeal vary, most circuits employ
a non-exhaustive, multi-factor test with no one factor dispositive,
such as that used by the Ninth Circuit.78 Factors examined by the
Ninth Circuit include:
 Strength of the mark;
 Proximity of the goods;
 Similarity of the marks;
 Evidence of actual confusion;
 Marketing channels used;
 Type of goods and the degree of care likely to
be exercised by the purchaser;
 Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and
 Likelihood of expansion of the product lines79
Trademarks enjoy even more robust protection under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1998 (“FTDA”).80 This statute
protects “[t]he owner of a famous mark . . . against another
person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if
such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”81 As Judge
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, “[t]o be
dilutive, use of the mark need not bring to mind the junior user
alone. The distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no
longer brings to mind the senior user alone.”82 Notably, when

77

Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
79
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d at 348–49. The Second Circuit’s likelihood of confusion
test, based on Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961),
is nearly identical. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97,
115 (2d Cir. 2009).
80
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
81
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
82
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
78
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proceeding under a dilution theory, a plaintiff need not prove
likelihood of consumer confusion or mistake as to source.83
B. Copyright
Unlike trademark, whose constitutional authorization is
embedded in the Commerce Clause, copyright derives its authority
from Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, the Intellectual
Property Clause, which states: “The Congress shall have the power
. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”84 In the
modern seminal case interpreting this constitutional provision,
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services,85 the Supreme
Court explained that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’”86
Copyright protects “original works of authorship” as soon as
they are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”87 Works of
authorship include “literary” and “dramatic works,” as well as
“motion pictures and other audiovisual works.”88 The Supreme
Court has explained that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is
originality”89 and that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright,
means only that the work was independently created by the author .
. . and that it possesses some minimal degree of creativity. . . .
83

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to
an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become
famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury.”) (emphasis added).
84
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
85
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
86
Id. at 349. In so holding, the court expressly rejected the theory that a telephone
directory was entitled to copyright protection on the basis of the labor expended by the
compiler of the directory. Id. at 362 (“[t]he selection, coordination, and arrangement of
Rural’s white pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright
protection.”).
87
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
88
Id.
89
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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[T]he requisite degree of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice.”90
Copyright thus protects minimally creative artistic expression,
but it does not protect the underlying idea itself.91 Accordingly,
where there is only one, or there are very few ways of expressing
an idea, the idea and the expression are said to “merge” and the
expression is rendered uncopyrightable.92 The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit explained that the rationale for the rule was to
prevent the appropriation of the subject matter as a whole to the
holder of the copyright in the form in which the idea is
expressed.93 For the same reason, the doctrine of scenes-à-faire
prevents the copyrighting of the “incidents, characters or settings
which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard,
in the treatment of a given topic.”94
As Leslie Kurtz notes, “Character is a part of a work that is
protected by copyright, but is not itself the subject of copyright.”95
Thus, a character can receive copyright protection if it is
sufficiently well delineated in a larger literary or artistic work.96

90

Id.; see also Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (explaining that copyright’s low bar to protection for creative
works aligns with the public’s psychological preference for an artistic marketplace
featuring a large number of new works of moderate originality rather than a more limited
marketplace of highly innovative works).
91
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
92
See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (“When
the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily requires,’
if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting
would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could
exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.”) (citations omitted).
93
Id. at 679; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that “blank
account-books are not the subject of copyright; and that the mere copyright . . . did not
confer upon [the Plaintiff] the exclusive right to make and use account-books”).
94
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
95
Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L.
REV. 429, 440.
96
See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that
as a matter of law, the characters at issue in the defendant’s movie “Rocky” were
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Of course, the flip side of this doctrine is that “the less developed
the characters, the less they can be copyrighted.”97 In the
landmark case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,98 Judge
Learned Hand noted that copyright law cannot be limited to the
text of a creative work, “else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations.”99 Instead, Judge Hand proposed comparing
the two works through a “series of abstractions.”100 Later courts
applying this language consider the work through such
abstractions, filter out that expression which is unprotectable, and
determine if a “reasonable observer could find [what remains]
substantially similar beyond the level of generalized or otherwise
nonprotectible ideas.”101 Substantial similarity is a necessarily
amorphous concept. As Judge Hand explained in Nichols, themes
and broad ideas in plays and literature are not protected by the
copyright in the work as these are no more than the author’s ideas.
In Nichols, for example, Judge Hand considered a claim that the
defendant’s movie The Cohens and The Kellys infringed the
plaintiffs play Abie’s Irish Rose.102 Among other things, Judge
Hand found that one pair of the plaintiff’s characters were little
more than “low comedy” “stock figures” and another were “so
faintly indicated as to be no more than stage properties.”103
Accordingly, the Nichols court held, the plaintiff’s copyright in
Abie’s Irish Rose did not protect these characters and the
defendant’s use of similar characters did not infringe the plaintiff’s
copyright.104
The Second Circuit uses a two-part test for copyright
infringement: “(a) that the defendant copied from the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work and (b) that the copying . . . went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation.”105 The court has held that the
“delineated so extensively that they [were] protected from bodily appropriation when
taken as a group and transposed into a sequel by another author”).
97
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
98
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
99
Id. at 121.
100
Id.
101
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
102
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120.
103
Id. at 122.
104
Id.
105
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
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evidence of copying could be proved either by “defendant’s
admission” or “circumstantial evidence” of access.106 “A party can
establish access either by demonstrating that (1) the infringed work
has been widely disseminated or (2) a particular chain of events
exists by which the alleged infringer might have gained access to
the copyrighted work.”107 Where access to protectable expression
is found, only substantial similarity between the original work and
the allegedly copying work “will support a determination of
infringement.”108
Not every use of copyrighted material is an infringing use,
however; fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright
infringement.109 This defense protects use of copyrighted material
for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
. . . scholarship, or research.”110 In analyzing whether a use is
indeed fair, courts consider:




106

the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and

Id.
Repp v. Webber, 947 F. Supp. 105, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted).
108
Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 4
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][a]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (“The question in each case is whether the similarity
relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of the plaintiff’s work—not whether
such material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant’s work. . . . The quantitative
relation of the similar material to the total material contained in plaintiff’s work is
certainly of importance. However, even if the similar material is quantitatively small, if
it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may properly find substantial similarity. . . .
[U]nder such circumstances the defendant may not claim immunity on the grounds the
infringement ‘is such a little one.’ If, however, the similarity is only as to nonessential
matters, then a finding of no substantial similarity should result.”).
109
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010).
110
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
107
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the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.111
The maxim de minimis non curat lex—the law does not
concern itself with trivialities—“applies to copyright actions no
less than to other branches of law.”112 As used in copyright law,
the doctrine means simply that “trivial copying is not an
infringement.”113 As Judge Leval of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals explained:
The de minimis doctrine is rarely discussed in
copyright opinions because suits are rarely brought
over trivial instances of copying. Nonetheless, it is
an important aspect of the law of copyright. Trivial
copying is a significant part of modern life. . . .
Parents in Central Park photograph their children
perched on José de Creeft’s Alice in Wonderland
sculpture. We record television programs aired
while we are out, so as to watch them at a more
convenient hour. Waiters at a restaurant sing
“Happy Birthday” at a patron’s table. When we do
such things, it is not that we are breaking the law
but unlikely to be sued given the high cost of
litigation. Because of the de minimis doctrine, in
trivial instances of copying, we are in fact not
breaking the law.114
However, while the doctrine permits “literal copying of a small
and usually insignificant portion of the plaintiff’s work,”115 courts
are careful to note that “even if a copied portion be relatively small
in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively important, the
finder of fact may properly find substantial similarity.”116
Unsurprisingly, then, when the subject of a copyright infringement
111

Id. § 107(1)–(4).
2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[G]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010).
113
Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
114
Id.
115
Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
116
CyberMedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(quoting Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987)).
112
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action is a word or short phrase, this “qualitatively substantial”
doctrine comes in conflict with the de minimis doctrine.
The regulations and policies promulgated by the United States
Copyright Office particularly affect words and short phrases such
as those embodied in fictional trademarks like “Duff Beer.” In
1958, the Copyright Office issued a circular stating:
To be entitled to copyright protection, a work must
contain something capable of being copyrighted—
that is, an appreciable amount of original text or
pictorial material. . . . Brand names, trade names,
slogans, and other short phrases or expressions
cannot be copyrighted, even if they are distinctively
arranged or printed.117
The circular suggests that such phrases are better addressed
under the laws of trademark and unfair competition.118 The
following year, the Copyright Office enacted 37 C.F.R. § 202.1,
refusing registration, inter alia, for “[w]ords and short phrases such
as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring;
mere listing of ingredients or contents.”119 This regulatory bar
against copyright protection for words and short phrases “has
historically been justified with copyright’s ‘originality’
requirement: A small expression is deemed to lack sufficient
originality.”120
117

See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. 390 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 46, COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND
LABELS (1958) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND LABELS]). The
current version of this circular is CIRCULAR NO. 34, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION NOT
AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT PHRASES (2009) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES OR SHORT PHRASES], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf.
118
COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND LABELS, supra note 117. The current
version of the Circular states, “Some brand names, trade names, slogans, and phrases
may be entitled to protection under laws relating to unfair competition, or they may be
entitled to protection and registration under the provisions of state or federal trademark
laws. . . . The Copyright Office has no role in these matters.” See COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT PHRASES, supra note 117.
119
37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2010).
120
Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
575, 578 (2005).
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Because copyright protection attaches automatically to a work
as soon as it is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression,”121
registration of the work with the Copyright Office is permissive
and is not required for copyright protection to attach.122 However,
because the copyright statute provides that “no civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been
made”123 with the Copyright Office, the filing of an application for
registration is “a condition precedent for an infringement case to
move forward in federal court.”124 Importantly, however, the
statute does not require the registration to have actually been
approved for an infringement suit to proceed. The Copyright Act
provides that
where the deposit, application, and fee required for
registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been
refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil
action for infringement if notice thereof, with a
copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of
Copyrights.125
Therefore, while the registration requirement may erect a speed
bump in the path of an impending copyright litigation, and may
even involve the Copyright Office intervening in the litigation and
arguing as to its merits, the Copyright Office’s refusal to register a
work cannot prevent even an unmeritorious infringement action
from going to trial.

121

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
Id. § 408(a).
123
Id. § 411(a).
124
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16[B][1][a]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010). The Supreme Court recently classified 17 U.S.C. §
411(a)’s registration requirement as a “claim-processing” rule, i.e., “a precondition to
filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.” Reid
Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010). However, the Court declined to
address whether “district courts may or should enforce [§ 411(a)’s registration
requirement] sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving
unregistered works.” Id. at 1249.
125
17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
122
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There is some disagreement among courts as to the role the de
minimis doctrine and § 202.1 play in determining if a word or short
phrase can ever be copyrightable. In Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea
Dumon, Inc.,126 the Seventh Circuit found that a phrase on the
packaging of the plaintiff’s product, “the most personal sort of
deodorant,” was not subject to copyright protection because it was
“merely a short phrase or expression which hardly qualifies as an
appreciable amount of original text.”127 The court further held that
“to the extent that the phrase was connected with the artwork by
different typography than the rest of the text, it is not protected
because . . . mere distinctiveness in typographic ornamentation will
not ordinarily qualify otherwise noncopyrightable material for
copyright protection.”128 The Second Circuit took a similar
approach in Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp.129 in
1959, echoing the language of the 1958 Copyright Office circular:
“[b]rand names, trade names, slogans, and other short phrases or
expressions cannot be copyrighted, even if they are distinctively
arranged or printed.”130 Taken together, these two cases appear to
close the door to any copyright protection in a trademark.
By contrast, several more recent cases appear to re-open the
possibility of copyright in a single word or a short phrase. For
example, in Narell v. Freeman,131 Judge Farris characterized the
title of a Frank Zappa song, “Weasels Ripped My Flesh” as an
“original and hence protected phrase.”132 Similarly in Life Music,
Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co.,133 the court stated in dicta that
copyright protection might be available for the single invented
word, “supercalifragilisticexpialidocious.”134
In Bird v.
126

466 F.2 705 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128
Id.
129
266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959).
130
Id. at 544.
131
872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
132
Id. at 911.
133
241 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
134
Id.
at
656
(“[E]ven
if
defendants
copied
only
‘the
word’
[supercalifragilisticexpialidocious], they conceivably might still be liable for
infringement.”); see also Tree Publ’g Co. v. Warner Bros. Records, 785 F. Supp. 1272,
1275 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Life Music approvingly and characterizing the word
“supercalifragilisticexpialidocious” as “capriciously fanciful”).
127
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Parsons,135 the Sixth Circuit noted that “copyright ordinarily does
not subsist in a single word”136 and that in the case of “financia,”
the plaintiff’s “claim that the word derives from another language
suggests a lack of originality and creativity.”137 The court held that
the “defendants’ alleged use of the word ‘efinancia’ [in its domain
name] simply does not reproduce any of the creativity that entitles
Bird to a copyright in the computer program titled Financia.”138
Instead, the court held that because “the word derives from another
language” it lacked “originality and creativity.”139
In Cook v. Robbins,140 an unpublished opinion from the Ninth
Circuit, the court went even further. In that case, plaintiff Cook
had written a book entitled “Wall Street Money Machine,” which
shared strategies for investing in stocks which Cook had distilled
from his experience as a cab driver. Two of the book’s prominent
themes were the idea of a “meter drop,” that is, Cook’s experience
that “he could make more money taking numerous short trips than
by waiting for higher fares,” and the concept of a “rolling stock”: a
stock that “tends to consistently roll up to a specific price point and
then drop down to a specific price point in an obvious pattern of
repeated waves.”141 When Robbins used Cook’s phrases in his
Financial Power seminar manual, Cook sued for copyright
infringement. At trial, the jury found for Cook and awarded
$655,900 in damages but the district court granted judgment as a
matter of law for the defendant because it found that “Cook failed
to prove that any of [Robbins’] profits were attributable to phrases
from [Cook’s] book.”142 Citing Feist, the Ninth Circuit reinstated
the award holding that “Cook’s complete expressions in conveying
the meaning of ‘meter drop’ and ‘rolling stock’ are creative, even
135

289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
137
Id. at 882; cf. Santrayll v. Burrell 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1052, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that “the repetition of the non-protectible word ‘uh-oh’ in a distinctive rhythm
comprises a sufficiently original composition to render it protectible by the copyright
laws”).
138
Parsons, 289 F.3d at 881.
139
Id. at 882.
140
Nos. 98-36242, 99-35141, 14695 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.american-justice.org/upload/page/108/65/cook_v_robbins.pdf.
141
Id. at 14700.
142
Id. at 14699.
136
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if only minimally so, and are protected by his copyright in Wall
Street Money Machine.”143 The parties eventually settled, but not
before the Copyright Office “proposed that the U.S. intervene to
request rehearing en banc” out of concern that the holding “would
undermine Rule 202.1.”144 The Ninth Circuit subsequently ordered
the opinion unpublished.145
Unsurprisingly, Justin Hughes
remarks that “it is hard to think of a better example of the
qualitatively substantial doctrine than Cook v. Robbins.”146
More recently, in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,147 the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a system of part numbers
used by a manufacturer of screw fasteners was excluded from
copyright protection because it was “not original”148 and for the
independent reason that the numbers themselves were “analogous
to short phrases or the titles of works.”149 Acting as amicus curiae,
the United States submitted that the Register of Copyrights, relying
on § 202.1, “routinely and categorically denies protection to all
part numbers, no matter how creative.”150 Citing § 202.1 and the
1958 Copyright Office circular, the majority held that “the
Copyright Office’s longstanding practice of denying registration to
short phrases merits deference.”151
Judge Roth, joined by Judge Chertoff dissented, challenging
the majority’s view of the conclusiveness of the de minimis
doctrine and the regulation: “even if Southco’s part numbers were
properly considered ‘short phrases,’ § 202.1 is best understood as a
rough starting point for an originality analysis, not a shortcut for
avoiding this analysis.”152 Noting that “[s]hort phrases are
typically unprotectable because they are either insufficiently
independent or insufficiently creative or both,” Judge Roth argued
that “it does not make sense to state categorically that no
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 14711.
Hughes, supra note 120, at 591.
Cook v. Robbins, 232 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2001).
Hughes, supra note 120, at 589.
390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 286.
Id. at 298 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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combination of numbers or words short enough to be deemed a
‘phrase’ can possess ‘at least some minimal degree of creativity’”
as required by the Supreme Court under Feist.153 Therefore, she
argued, “it would seem (notwithstanding [§ 202.1]) that even a
short phrase may command copyright protection if it exhibits
sufficient creativity.”154 This analysis was cited with approval by
Judge Kane of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado in 2009.155
The next Part applies the two doctrines outlined above to the
fictional trademark problem and highlights the strengths and
weaknesses of proceeding under either doctrine.
II. A TRADEMARK OR A COPYRIGHT INJURY?
Fox and The Simpsons’ creator, Matt Groening, developed the
idea for the fictional brand, Duff. Therefore, when a real-world
manufacturer puts out a product by the same name, one might
think that it has stolen Fox’s idea and that, as a matter of equity,
intellectual property law ought to furnish a remedy. But
intellectual property law does not protect ideas in the abstract.156
While a real-world Duff manufacturer may have taken more than
just an idea, it is difficult to articulate how much more. Part of the
reason it is so difficult to conceptualize the injury Fox suffers
when another producer introduces a Duff Beer to the marketplace
stems from the fact that Duff Beer is a fictional product sold in a
fictional universe under a fictional brand name. Fox’s injury looks
very different when we suspend our disbelief and plunge into the
153

Id.
Id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2.01[B] (3d ed. 1994)).
155
See Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 2009) (“I am persuaded by Judge Roth that the Copyright Office’s
regulation does not strip copyright protection from . . . original expressions [which are
manifested in short phrases].”).
156
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing copyright protection for creative
expression, but not the idea underlying that expression, as soon as the expression is fixed
“in a tangible medium”), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (providing protection for functional matter
which meets the requirements of novelty, utility, non-obviousness and other statutory
criteria), and 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (providing protection for symbols used as designations of
source in commerce).
154
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fictional world of Springfield, accepting the fictional reality as our
own and when we pull back, remind ourselves that The Simpsons is
nothing more than a cartoon and view Duff Beer as one element of
a vividly imagined work of animated fiction. As a consequence of
this puzzle of perspective, Fox suffers a different intellectual
property injury depending on our vantage point.
An analogy to Internet law helps explicate the puzzle. Writing
on the problem of perspective in this area of the law, Professor
Orin Kerr posits that “whenever we apply law to the Internet, we
must first decide whether to apply the law to the facts as seen from
the viewpoint of physical reality or virtual reality.”157 Kerr terms
the perspective from inside virtual reality the “‘internal
perspective’ of the Internet” and the point of view of an “outsider
concerned with the functioning of the network in the physical
world rather than the perceptions of a user” the “external
perspective.”158 In attempting to apply law to the Internet, our
perception of who is doing what to whom is not a mere cognitive
tool for conceptualizing difficult problems, Kerr contends.
Instead, our selection of perspective is itself outcome
determinative, because “[b]y choosing the perspective, we choose
the reality; by choosing the reality, we choose the facts; and by
choosing the facts, we choose the law.”159 While Kerr suggests
that courts may dismiss this problem of perspective as “a minor
skirmish in the ‘battle of analogies,’” he notes that courts “already
choose perspectives when they apply law to the Internet” without
realizing it.160
The analogy to Internet law is not a perfect fit. For one thing,
while the Internet is interactive, such that users can participate in
the virtual world, even creating and trading on their own marks
within that world,161 Springfield is a closed universe: we can enjoy
it only as it is presented to us by Fox. Nevertheless, the fictional
world of Springfield is, like the Internet, a vast virtual world. We
157
Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357
(2003).
158
Id. at 359–60.
159
Id. at 361.
160
Id. at 381.
161
See infra Part III.
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can understand it, as we can the Internet, from an internal
perspective, wherein Duff Beer is real and dominates the
marketplace or from the external perspective in which we are
aware that Duff is a parody: a farcical wink at popular culture
embedded in a work of pure fiction. Kerr’s methodology is thus a
good fit for the problem of fictional trademarks as well, because it
provides an analytical framework for exploring how the ontology
of a fictional mark, like our understanding of the “facts” of the
Internet, changes depending on our perspective. As with Internet
law, by choosing the perspective, we choose to view Duff either as
a real beer which has really been used in commerce, or as a
colorful aspect of a fictional work which is used to entertain. By
choosing between these versions of reality, we choose the legal
remedies available. Thus, Kerr’s lens of perspective helps us
identify two different versions of a story Fox can tell in court, and
in turn, suggests the law to be applied.
Viewing this problem from the internal perspective, that is,
from the vantage point of a resident of Springfield, Fox can claim a
trademark injury. Having already used Duff Beer as a mark, it will
argue, the breweries’ latter use of the mark as an indicator of
source for beer is likely to lead to consumer confusion as to the
origin of the beer.162 Fox can also bring an action for dilution,
alleging that the breweries’ use of the name “Duff” weakens the
distinctiveness of its famous mark even if it is not being used on
beer.163 Proceeding under a dilution theory, Duff would not even
have to make out a showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion.
Fox could also view the situation from the external perspective.
Seen this way, Duff Beer is a significant element of its literary
property, The Simpsons. Because the expression of a parodic beer
with an unflattering name is minimally creative artistic expression
fixed in the tangible medium of film, the breweries’ appropriation
of Fox’s original expression might constitute a copyright injury.164
Both of these theories accurately provide a way of
conceptualizing the injury Fox suffers from the breweries’ actions,
162
163
164

See infra Part III.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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yet both are doctrinally problematic. While Duff Beer is itself a
brand name (albeit a fictional one) Duff would have had to have
used the mark in commerce to reserve rights in the mark.165 That
being so, the court would have to find that Fox and Groening’s use
of “Duff” within the fictional world of Springfield is sufficient to
establish priority in the mark such that another’s use of that mark
would constitute trademark infringement. The copyright theory is
troublesome as well. While it is perhaps more intellectually honest
to say that the only way Fox has really used the mark has been as
part of the texture of its literary property, The Simpsons, copyright
law’s de minimis doctrine may permit the use of the word “Duff”
on beer and declines independent protection for words and short
phrases such as “Duff Beer.” Thus, if a copyist took Duff Beer
and all of Homer Simpson with it, Fox could easily establish
copyright infringement. But if a copyist takes no more than the
words “Duff Beer” and even the Duff label, it is difficult to argue
that this expression is substantial enough to be protected by Fox’s
copyright in The Simpsons. This Part explores whether either
doctrine can or should furnish fictional trademarks with real-life
protection.
A. The Trademark Theory of Fictional Trademarks
Taking the internal perspective and assuming a traditional
trademark infringement scenario, i.e., that Duff’s competitor is a
junior user making a product called “Duff Beer” in Springfield,
trademark law endows Duff with a full doctrinal arsenal.
If Springfield were within the jurisdiction of American federal
law, and a competitor of Duff manufactured and sold a rival
product, also called Duff Beer, the original Duff would have an
easy case. The original Duff—the senior user—would merely
have to prove that it had made bona fide use of the mark in
commerce in connection with the sale of goods, and that “the
defendant’s use of that mark is likely to cause [consumer]

165
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a); see also Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503
(7th Cir. 1992).
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confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the
defendant with the plaintiff” as a result.166
Within the fictional world of Springfield, Duff has a strong,
distinctive mark.167 It would be an understatement to say that Duff
Brewery has used the mark in commerce as a designation of source
in connection with the sale of beer. Advancing to the likelihood of
confusion analysis, a court would likely emphasize the strength of
the mark (in the case of Duff, a strong, distinctive mark, made
more so by Duff’s extensive advertising), proximity of the goods
(both are beers) the similarity of the marks (the marks are
identical) and perhaps most significantly, the defendant’s intent in
selecting the mark (a court will almost certainly infer that the
junior user’s use of “Duff” as a trademark for beer strongly
indicates its intent to divert business from the senior user). In this
scenario, Duff would win handily.
Even if a new market entrant were to manufacture Duff shoes,
or Duff automobile parts, Duff would have an easy dilution case.
Given its extensive market penetration, Duff would easily establish
its fame and would be virtually certain to succeed on its claim that
the junior user’s use of the mark would dilute Duff’s mark by
blurring: that is, by weakening the mark’s uniqueness in the
public’s eyes.168
But take the junior user out of Springfield, into the real world,
and all bets are off. The major hurdle for Duff is priority. Within
Springfield, Duff easily meets this requirement by means of its use

166
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
167
A court would almost certainly find the mark to be a suggestive mark (i.e.,
suggesting either that in sufficient quantities, it transforms the consumer into a lumbering
clod or causes him to spend a significant amount of time on his rear end). See Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 455 (Austl.) (“It is
fair to say that the beer and its consumption are not shown in a favourable light.”).
168
Because of trademark law’s balancing act vis-à-vis the First Amendment, however,
a book or educational video about Duff Beer would be a permissible use of the mark.
Similarly, Fudd, Duff’s rival from the fictional town of Shelbyville, is free to run an ad
contending that “Fudd tastes better than Duff.” See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296
F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“These are uses that, though potentially dilutive, are
nevertheless permitted: comparative advertising; news reporting and commentary; and
noncommercial use.”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B)).
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of the mark on its beer as well as on Duff Gardens and in
associated advertising. Here in the real world, however, it is much
harder to establish that Duff and its creators Groening and Fox
have actually used the mark in commerce such as to establish
priority in the mark. Indeed, as “[t]he use requirement rewards
those who act quickly in getting new products in the hands of
consumers,”169 courts may be more sympathetic to the Rodrigo
Contrerases of the world who make diligent efforts to speed new
products to market—particularly those for which there is ample
demand.
Courts considering these issues in two prominent fictional
trademark cases found a real-life trademark injury for the
appropriation of fictional trademarks. This Note now considers
both in turn.
1. DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers
In DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers,170 DC Comics sued Jerry
Powers, the publisher of an “alternate culture” publication calling
itself The Daily Planet—the same name as “the fictional
Metropolis newspaper which employs Superman’s alter ego”171—
from DC’s Superman comic book series. DC Comics sued Powers
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.172 Powers moved for a
preliminary injunction “to preclude [DC Comics] from any use of
the name Daily Planet” and DC Comics cross-moved for injunctive
relief “seeking to preclude [Powers] from any use of the Daily
Planet.”173 While Powers had at one point registered the name The
Daily Planet as a trademark for his newspaper, the newspaper
folded in 1973 and the mark was cancelled by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office in 1976.174 Both DC Comics and
Powers claimed exclusive rights to use of The Daily Planet, based

169

Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1992).
465 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
171
Id. at 845.
172
Id.; see Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“[F]alse designation of
origin”).
173
Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 845–46.
174
Id. at 847.
170
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on their prior use of the name. As the court noted, however, what
was “really at issue” was whether either party would be “entitled to
exclusive exploitation of the name Daily Planet based on the
expected wave of public interest in the Superman character
calculated to result from the release of the Superman movie” that
year.175
The court began by analyzing the comparative use of the mark
by both DC Comics and Powers. Noting that The Daily Planet
first appeared in the Superman story in 1940, the court emphasized
that since that time, the fictional newspaper had “played a key role,
not only in the development of the Superman story, but also in the
development of the Superman character.”176 The court emphasized
that DC had “gone to great effort and expense throughout the long
history of Superman to utilize the Superman character in
connection with a myriad of products born of the Superman
story.”177 While the fictional paper “was never singled out” in any
of DC’s many licensing agreements for use of the Superman
characters, the court noted that it was “part and parcel of the
typical licensing agreement” and that the fictional newspaper had
been “prominently featured on many products emanating from
these licensing agreements.”178 The court contrasted DC’s use of
The Daily Planet with Powers’ use of the mark, which it
characterized as “brief and, at best, sporadic.”179 Accordingly, the
court found that “only [DC Comics] has demonstrated an
association of such duration and consistency with the Daily Planet
sufficient to establish a common law trademark therein” and noted
that “the Daily Planet has over the years become inextricably
woven into the fabric of the Superman story.”180
In holding that plaintiff DC Comics had “demonstrated a
probability of success on the merits sufficient to warrant” the grant
of an injunction against Powers’ use of The Daily Planet, the court

175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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suggested two rationales underpinning its decision.181
It
emphasized that “plaintiff has . . . engaged in extensive licensing
of the Superman character as well as the Superman story covering
a myriad of products” and “the Daily Planet has played a key role
in many of these licensing agreements.”182 It also noted that “the
Daily Planet has become so closely associated with the
presentation of the Superman story that any use thereof by
defendants would create a substantial likelihood of confusion at the
consumer level.”183 The court concluded that it was thus “quite
apparent that defendants, both in adopting the Daily Planet as the
title of their newspaper and in its publication, intended to at least
confuse, if not to deceive the public as to the origin of the
publication.”184
The licensing agreements certainly represent real-world uses in
commerce and appear to have been central to the court’s finding
that DC Comics possessed a common law trademark in The Daily
Planet. Further, while the court leans heavily on DC’s use of the
fictional paper to advance the Superman story, it is unclear if it
would have concluded that use of The Daily Planet in the story,
without more, was sufficient to support a finding of the existence
of a trademark.
2. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v South Australian
Brewing Co.
In a 1996 Australian case, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v
South Australian Brewing Co.,185 Fox and The Simpsons’ creator,
Matt Groening (“the producers”), brought suit against South
Australian Brewing Co. and Lion Nathan Australia (“the
breweries”) seeking to enjoin them “from promoting or dealing
with any product in the form of a can . . . with the wording, getup186 and name” of the fictional Duff Beer.187 The plaintiffs
181

Id. at 848.
Id.
183
Id. at 848–49 (emphasis added).
184
Id. at 849.
185
[1996] 66 FCR 451 (Austl.).
186
Also known as trade dress.
187
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 453
(Austl.).
182
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proceeded on two causes of action. The first alleged breach of
section 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 under Australian
law.188 While the Act does not mention the use of marks or
symbols at all, its language and policy rationale (i.e., consumer
protection) suggest that it is best construed as the Australian
analogue of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.189 The producers
also brought a cause of action for “passing off”190—that is, for
attempting to pass off the breweries’ goods as originating with the
producers—a common law tort in Australia, which is also
subsumed under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in American
law.191

188

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52 (Austl.). Entitled “Misleading or deceptive
conduct,” this provision states that “a corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage
in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.” The
provision is located under “Part V—Consumer Protection.”
189
Compare Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52 (Austl.) (“[A] corporation shall not,
in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to
mislead or deceive”) with Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006):
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
190
S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 452.
191
Id. at 472 (“[F]ive characteristics . . . must be present . . . to create a valid cause of
action for passing off: (1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade,
(3) to respective customers . . . or ultimate consumers of goods supplied by him, (4)
which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader . . . and (5) which
causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is
brought . . . .”); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23,
28 n.1 (2003) (“Passing off (or palming off as it is sometimes called) occurs when a
producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s. ‘Reverse passing
off,’ as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else’s
goods or services as his own.”). The Court noted that this conduct violates § 43 of the
Lanham Act. Id. at 30.
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The court began by noting that the name “Duff” was conceived
by Groening “as the name of an imaginary beer which would be
associated particularly with ‘Homer’ and also with his ‘bar-fly’
friends and associates” and that the beer “is assigned an important
role in the series viewed as a whole.”192 The court noted that Fox
had licensed clothing manufacturers in Australia to produce caps
and T-shirts193 and had also released comic books featuring the
fictional beer194 but has “consistently refused to grant licenses to
parties who have sought to use ‘The Simpsons’ in connection with
alcohol and tobacco products, or other substances considered
detrimental to children.”195 The court also noted that “[t]he
evidence clearly establishes that throughout the series there is a
clear and pervasive association of ‘Duff Beer’ with ‘Homer’ and
other characters such as ‘Barney,’ his friend”196 and emphasized
the show’s “wide coverage, deep market penetration, and broad
recognition”197 resulting in “substantial goodwill and reputation in
Australia in relation to the characters, names and images appearing
in ‘The Simpsons’ including the name ‘Duff Beer.’”198
The court found that the name “Duff” had “acquired a powerful
secondary meaning” when used in relation to the fictional beer.199
Indeed, in its view, “it would be artificial in the extreme to suggest
that consumers would be attracted by the concept of ‘Duff’ on the
basis of its dictionary meaning . . . [the] key attractive features
arise from the association with ‘The Simpsons’ and not from any
literal dictionary meaning of the word ‘duff.’”200
Importantly, the court noted:

192

S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 455 (“There is one whole episode substantially
devoted to the theme of ‘Duff Beer’ (Duffless) and the name ‘Duff’ features prominently
and repeatedly in another 22-minute episode, ‘Selma’s Choice’”).
193
Id. at 455–56.
194
Id. at 456 (noting that “[t]he merchandise contains references to copyright and to the
reserved rights of Groening or Twentieth Century Fox”).
195
Id. at 457.
196
Id. at 458.
197
Id. at 455.
198
Id. at 456.
199
Id. at 465.
200
Id.
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An unusual aspect of this case, is that it concerns
not a fictional ‘character’ as such, but a ‘makebelieve’ product, namely the fictional ‘Duff Beer’
which is coupled with a character, a background
institution, (Duff Brewery), and also with the
associated advertising signs, posters and images of
the beer, which play an important role in the series.
These features form part of the fictional
‘environment’ in which the stories are played out.
It plays a background role as part of the fictional
world which the characters inhabit.201
The court concluded that “the principles which apply to
character image or title association are equally applicable to the
name of a product which features in the program, in this instance,
‘Duff Beer.’”202 That being so, the court held that “the deliberate
creation by the breweries of an association by use of the name
‘Duff’ between the breweries’ beer can with ‘The Simpsons”
program, in circumstances where there is no association and
indeed, where such association is contrary to the express policy of
the producers, amounts to misleading and deceptive conduct.”203
The court found that the producers had successfully made out the
elements of passing off as well.204
In both Powers and South Australian, the courts seem to
embrace the principle articulated in DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation
201

Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 466.
203
Id. at 470. Although letters from the breweries to vendors made a “tongue-incheek” attempt at disassociation from The Simpsons (“Oh and (to be serious for a
moment) yes we’re aware of the fact that another ‘Duff Beer’ features in ‘The Simpson’s’
[sic] TV show. Please note Homer’s favourite drop is a completely separate, fictitious
product. We would encourage you not to use ‘Simpson’s’ [sic] imagery or logos in
supporting ‘Duff Beer’ as these are not owned by us and in doing so you may run the risk
of infringing legal copyright.”), the court found “a notable lack of any attempt to drive
this message home to the ‘consuming public.’” Id. at 471.
204
Id. at 472 (“There has been a misrepresentation as to the association of the goods
with ‘The Simpsons,’ made by [the] breweries in the course of trade, to prospective
customers or ultimate consumers. It is reasonably foreseeable that the business or
goodwill of ‘The Simpsons’ and their licensing and merchandising rights could be
adversely affected, particularly in the light of the policy in relation to alcohol
promotion.”).
202
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Associates that a significant ingredient of an entertainment work
can come to stand for the work in the public mind, and in so doing,
becomes a trademark.205 In Powers, the court emphasized the role
The Daily Planet played “not only in the Superman story, but also
in the development of the Superman character.”206 Indeed, the
court held that any use of the mark by the defendants would
“create a substantial likelihood of confusion at the consumer
level,”207 precisely “because the Daily Planet has become so
closely associated with the presentation of the Superman story.”208
Similarly, in South Australian, the court employed Filmation-type
reasoning in emphasizing the “important role” the “‘make-believe’
product” Duff Beer plays on The Simpsons.209
Indeed, the courts in Powers and South Australian note the
efforts of the plaintiffs in those cases to actively forge an
association between the fictional mark and the entertainment
franchise. The Powers court does this in two oblique ways. First,
it states that the “plaintiff has gone to great effort and expense
throughout the long history of Superman to utilize the Superman
character in connection with a myriad of products born of the
Superman story.”210 It then describes DC’s efforts to license and
merchandise Superman and notes that the “typical licensing
agreement would permit use not only of Superman, but of all the
Superman characters” and that The Daily Planet “has been
prominently featured on many products emanating from these
licensing agreements.”211 Without expressly so stating, the court
essentially reasoned that DC’s licensing of The Daily Planet on
merchandise represented its attempts to forge a link in the public

205

486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see supra notes 51–53 and accompanying

text.
206

DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 465 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 848–49.
208
Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
209
S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 465–66. The court’s conclusion that consumers
would actually be turned off by a product called “Duff” but for its association with The
Simpsons further strengthens the inference that a Filmation-type rationale undergirds the
reasoning in South Australian Brewing Co. Id.
210
Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 847.
211
Id.
207
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mind between the fictional trademark, The Daily Planet and DC’s
entertainment product, Superman.
Second, the Powers court notes that “the Daily Planet has
become so closely associated with the presentation of the
Superman story that any use thereof by defendants would create a
substantial likelihood of confusion . . . .”212 Though buried in the
passive voice, the Powers court seems to be saying that any use of
The Daily Planet by the defendants would create a substantial
likelihood of confusion because DC Comics had already succeeded
in linking that name to the Superman franchise. By contrast, the
court in South Australian appears implicitly to accept that the
producers of The Simpsons had made efforts to link Duff Beer to
the show when it notes with disapproval that “there is no
disclaimer to consumers on the [breweries’ Duff Beer] can, or in
the retail advertising or promotional material, to the effect that the
beer is not that referred to in ‘The Simpsons’ program.”213
B. The Copyright Theory of Fictional Trademarks
Although decided under trademark law, much of the reasoning
of the courts in Powers and South Australian seems to sound in
copyright rather than trademark. Indeed, because of the facts of
those two cases, Fox and DC Comics could have brought
supplemental copyright claims as well (although neither did).214
In Powers, the court found “substantial evidence indicating that
the adoption by defendants of the name Daily Planet in 1969 was
merely an attempt to cash in on the Superman story and its
notoriety.”215 The court noted “numerous references in the paper
not only to the Superman character, but also to the Superman
story,” including “[a] lead article entitled ‘Superman smokes super
dope,’” “[u]se of the phrase ‘Watchdog of Metropolis’ as its
slogan,” “[n]umerous drawings of the Superman character,” and
the “[u]se of a masthead which was an exact replica of the Daily
212

Id. at 848.
S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 470–71 (emphasis added).
214
See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D.
Ga. 1984) (noting that defendant’s infringing use of the “Superman” character was
significant enough that plaintiff could bring viable trademark and copyright claims).
215
Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 849.
213
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Planet insignia appearing in numerous Superman comic books.”216
Here, the court appears troubled by Powers’ unauthorized use of
DC’s artistic expression in its own right. This aspect of the court’s
reasoning sounds overwhelmingly in copyright, and indeed, may
have been enough to support an independent copyright action.
Similarly in South Australian, the court notes that “‘Duff Beer’
appears in nearly all episodes of [The Simpsons] broadcast in
Australia . . . with varying degrees of prominence” including “one
whole episode substantially devoted to the theme of ‘Duff Beer’
(Duffless) . . . and . . . another 22-minute episode, ‘Selma’s
Choice.’”217 Here, the Court’s language suggests that it sees Duff
Beer functioning like a fictional character which is sufficiently
well delineated to receive copyright protection, or is, at a
minimum, a substantial enough expressive element of the
Simpsons story that it would not be filtered away during an
abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis.218 Moreover, the South
Australian court noted that Duff’s strong identity, its extensive
fictional marketing, and its tether to Homer Simpson “form part of
the fictional ‘environment’ in which the stories are played out. It
plays a background role as part of the fictional world which the
characters inhabit.”219 Here, the court appears to view Duff as a
protectable element of Fox’s literary property and a defining
feature of a fictional world. This reasoning, too, sounds strongly in
copyright.
In some fictional trademark cases, such as Powers, the
defendant will have taken enough of the plaintiff’s protectable
expression that the plaintiff can bring a traditional copyright claim.
In such a case, the fictional mark will likely get swept up in the
court’s larger infringement analysis, receiving at most a passing
mention. When such an appreciable amount of original expression
is at issue, a court need not reach the issue of the copyrightability

216

Id.
S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 455.
218
See id. at 466 (“No doubt, the assignation of the name ‘Duff’ to the product was
designed to achieve a more believable specific fictional effect than to have an anonymous
generic ‘beer’ can and it serves to endow the characters with more focused identifiable
‘human’ traits.”).
219
Id. at 466.
217
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of the name and appearance of the fictional trademark itself; it
need only determine whether the copyright in the larger
entertainment work in which the mark is embedded has been
infringed. But the smaller the quantity of expression in dispute,
the more qualitative weight the fictional mark itself must bear and
the dicier the copyright analysis becomes.
For example, it is not at all clear what an American court
would do with the facts of the South Australian case had the
plaintiffs proceeded on a copyright infringement theory (and
brought the case in a United States district court). Determining
whether the breweries’ use of Duff Beer infringes Fox’s copyright
in The Simpsons or is a mere de minimis use requires the court to
analyze the role played by Duff Beer on The Simpsons. Because
no court has ever passed on a fictional trademark case brought on a
copyright infringement theory, it is difficult to know how a court
would rule. Nevertheless, certain dicta in the opinion of the South
Australian court’s opinion offer some clues. The South Australian
court found that the fictional beer plays “an important role in the
series” and “form[s] part of the fictional ‘environment’” of
Springfield.220 Seen this way, Fox’s copyright in The Simpsons
extends to “Duff Beer” because the fictional product is a
significant and well-defined creative element of the plot of The
Simpsons just as Homer, Moe and Barney are. The breweries’ use
of the name “Duff Beer” thus constitutes copyright infringement
(just as a drawing of Homer on the can surely would). Treating
well-defined fictional trademarks as something akin to protectable
fictional characters is easily justified under the minimal creativity
standard of Feist as well as the federal courts’ filtration test
jurisprudence.221 Moreover, the fact that the breweries’ use was
commercial strongly cuts against a finding of fair use.222

220

Id. at 465–66.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (finding
that the characters in defendant Stallone’s “Rocky” films were “so highly delineated that
they warrant copyright protection as a matter of law”).
222
See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The
fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use. Every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to
221
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Although copyright doctrine easily accommodates the above
approach, a court may nevertheless view the fictional Duff as mere
scenes-à-faire. On this reading, Duff Beer is a generic lowcomedy trope—the cheap beer—akin to the unprotectable
characters in Abie’s Irish Rose223 and accordingly unprotected by
Fox’s copyright in The Simpsons. Alternatively, the court could
find that while Duff Beer is sufficiently creative to be protected by
Fox’s copyright in The Simpsons, the breweries’ use of the name
“Duff Beer” alone constitutes de minimis copying, particularly in
light of their alteration of the appearance of the fictional can.224 In
fact, courts may have an incentive to view the problem this way. It
is the stated policy of the Copyright Office to direct those seeking
protection for “words, phrases, symbols or designs that distinguish
the goods or services of one party from those of another” to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and by implication, to
trademark law.225 This policy is likely to exert subtle pressure on
courts to find the breweries’ use of the Duff Beer name to be a de
minimis use of copyrighted material, but potentially cognizable
trademark infringement, and to channel the problem to trademark
law.
To proceed on its copyright infringement theory, Fox would
then have to argue that the two words “Duff Beer” are themselves
sufficiently creative that they should be entitled to independent
copyright protection. Forced to fend for itself as an independent
res, Duff Beer almost certainly loses on § 202.1 grounds. While
the imprimatur of the Copyright Office is not required for a
copyright action to proceed, it is clear that the agency’s views on
copyrightability hold sway with the federal courts. Indeed, while
the Southco majority noted a split of opinion among the federal

the owner of the copyright.” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
223
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
224
S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 471 (“The steps which are said to have been taken
to disassociate [the breweries’ beer from the Duff Beer on] ‘The Simpsons’ . . . include
ensuring that the words ‘The Simpsons’ were not referred to on the can and the design,
colour and get-up of the yellow can was said to be quite different from that featured in
‘The Simpsons.’ Nor did the image of any ‘Simpsons’ character appear on the can.”).
225
See COPYRIGHT PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT
PHRASES, supra note 117.
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courts regarding the level of deference owed to the Copyright
Office as a matter of administrative law, it reasoned that “[a]t a
minimum, the practice of the Copyright Office reflects a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance.”226 Moreover, as Professor
Hughes notes, “[a]lthough the [§ 202.1] bar exists only in the
regulations of the Copyright Office, courts have applied this rule
against claims of copyright” consisting of names and titles of
various creative works.227
In justifying the denial of copyright for Duff, however, the
court may go one step too far and turn back the claim of copyright
in “Duff Beer” on the reasoning that the fictional mark does not
manifest the minimum creativity required by Feist. Indeed, as
Justin Hughes points out, the de minimis doctrine is classically
justified by copyright’s originality doctrine.228 On this theory, “too
short equals not creative equals not copyrightable.”229 Such
reasoning is specious on its face. Judge Roth pointedly observed
that “it does not make sense to state categorically that no
combination of numbers or words short enough to be deemed a
‘phrase’ can possess ‘at least some minimal degree of
creativity.’”230 Professor Hughes is even more direct: “it is
fundamentally disingenuous to use the originality requirement as
the doctrinal bar against copyright protection of titles, names and
short phrases” because “[m]any very small expressions positively
leap over the low threshold of originality we have established in
copyright law.”231 Indeed, in Southco, the government essentially
conceded as much in its brief: “we note that the Copyright Office
will not register even a creative short phrase.”232 The troubling

226

Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
227
Hughes, supra note 120, at 581.
228
Id. at 578.
229
Id. at 605.
230
Southco, 390 F.3d at 286 (Roth, J., dissenting) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
231
Hughes, supra note 120, at 578.
232
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 15 Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-1243) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201034.pdf.
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tendency of courts to press Feist into service to justify the de
minimis bar calls into question the rationale for denying
independent copyright protection to words, symbols and short
phrases.
If lack of creativity is a spurious justification for the de minimis
doctrine, might there still be a workable policy justification for a
de minimis doctrine in copyright law? Hughes himself poses the
best justification for the de minimis doctrine, arguing for a
minimum-size requirement in copyright on the basis of preserving
the balance of the overall doctrinal and statutory scheme of
copyright.233 For example, Hughes notes, the third factor in the
statutory fair use defense, “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” is of
course “directly sensitive to the size of the work.”234 Further,
because courts often favor a finding of fair use where the second
use is “transformative,” that is, a use which recontextualizes the
borrowed material rather than merely appropriating it, Hughes
argues that the smaller the work, the less likely a second use is to
be transformative.235 There is, thus, a legitimate concern that a
proliferation of such “microworks” would swallow the fair use
defense.236 Further, Hughes points out, copyright law is intended
to protect literary “compositions.”237 On this rationale, American
and English courts have rejected protection for the label on a bottle
of scotch238 and in the invented word “Exxon”239 among other
things.

233
Hughes, supra note 120, at 578 (“The real issue is not lack of originality; the real
issue is size.”).
234
Id. at 629 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).
235
Id. at 629.
236
Id. at 578, 619.
237
Id. at 628–33.
238
Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) (concluding that “[t]o be entitled to a
copyright the article must have by itself some value as a composition, at least to the
extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or designation of the
subject to which it is attached”).
239
Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants Int’l, Ltd., [1981] 2 All E.R. 495, aff’d
[1982] Ch. 119 (A.C.) (Eng.) (“I would have thought . . . that unless there is something in
the context of the [copyright] Act which forbids it, a literary work would be something
which was intended to afford either information and instruction, or pleasure in the form
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Finally, there is the concern for what Hughes calls the “Oscar
Wilde Principle”: a concern with removing “[m]uch of the world
of witticisms, pithy observations, and insightful judgments” from
the public domain.240 As Judge Roth conceded in her Southco
dissent, “[i]t may well be that short expressions must hurdle a
slightly higher creativity bar than longer works” so that “mundane
phrases or slight variations on common expressions” will not be
“taken out of the public domain.”241 This concern overlaps with
the merger doctrine’s directive not to permit a party to appropriate
a given body of subject matter by copyrighting the few forms that
that subject matter might take.242 But it goes further and implicates
the constitutional balance between the First Amendment and the
Intellectual Property Clause. While the latter secures “for limited
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings,”243 the length of that limited time has grown
considerably: from twenty-eight years, (renewable for another
twenty-eight years) under the 1909 act, to forty-seven years
(renewable for another twenty years) under the 1976 act, to a total
of ninety-five years under the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act.244 For works created after 1976, copyright
protection lasts even longer.245 With “limited times” becoming
substantially less so, a court should indeed be particularly
circumspect before removing a quip or other short phrase from the
public domain for what is likely to be a century or more.
Thus, whether “Duff Beer” is sufficiently creative to warrant
independent copyright protection is probably the wrong question;
Duff almost certainly is. But at bottom, the question of whether or
of literary entertainment. . . . I am not sure whether [Exxon] can be said to be a ‘work’ at
all; I am clearly of the opinion that it cannot be said to be a ‘literary work.’”).
240
Hughes, supra note 120, at 612.
241
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 300 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(Roth, J., dissenting).
242
Id. at 293 n.11.
243
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
244
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 9:08 (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2010).
245
Under the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, copyright protection
“endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s
death,” or for posthumous works, 95 years from the year of first publication or 120 years
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
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not independent copyright protection should attach to a fictional
trademark such as Duff has more to do with copyright’s overall
doctrinal scheme and purpose than with the level of creativity of
the fictional brand. Particularly in a case like South Australian,
then, where the defendant did not take any of the artwork
associated with the fictional can, it may be correct to say that the
plaintiff has not suffered a copyright injury. Copyright protection
is doubtless appropriate in cases such as Powers where significant
visual or literary expression has been appropriated together with a
fictional mark. But to extend copyright protection to a logo,
standing alone, no matter how creative, may simply place too
much of a strain on copyright’s purpose and throw off the delicate
balance struck by this body of intellectual property law.
III. DOCTRINAL SOLUTION: TAILORING THE TRADEMARK ANALYSIS
TO THE FICTIONAL TRADEMARK PROBLEM
A real-life logo which may fall short of the originality required
for copyright—some colors and a word or two, for instance—will
often possess the requisite distinctiveness for trademark protection
to attach, and will certainly do so where the name bears a nondescriptive relationship to the product. As a legal matter, then,
trademark law is better equipped than copyright to provide
protection for such logos. But, this Note argues, trademark law is
also superior to copyright law for the protection of fictional
trademarks as an analytical matter.
If instead of brewing Duff Beer, for example, Rodrigo
Contreras were preparing derivative works—that is, producing new
Simpsons episodes and selling those—Fox’s injury would indeed
sound predominantly in copyright (although Fox almost certainly
has trademarks in Homer, Moe and company). In this scenario,
Fox is really complaining of the appropriation of its literary
property and its creative visual art. However, the injury Fox
suffers when another company manufactures the fictional beer
from its show is that people think The Simpsons has something to
do with the beer. The breweries’ actions thus “cause confusion,”
“mistake,” or “deceive as to the affiliation, connection or
association . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval” of the
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beer.246 They create confusion in the marketplace. The breweries
use the wealth of brand information packed into a symbol to
deceive and they trade on the good will accumulated by another
producer of a very different product. Duff Beer, then, acts as a
very distinctive trademark, but not a trademark for beer. In
appropriating the Duff Beer mark, the breweries trade on the good
will The Simpsons has carefully built up in its entertainment
franchise and signal to consumers that the beer contains the same
experiential qualities as or bears the endorsement of that
entertainment product.247 In so doing, the breweries “reap the
financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable
product.”248 Just not their product. In this way, the appropriation
of a fictional trademark leads to a real-world trademark injury.
Nevertheless, there remains the problem of determining how
(or if) Fox has reserved priority in the Duff Beer mark. Here, this
Note endorses an approach similar to that of the court in Filmation,
which found that the prominent use of an ingredient of a fictional
work (in that case, a fictional character) led to that ingredient’s
coming to “symbolize the plaintiff in the public mind” here in the
real world.249 The courts in both Powers and South Australian
likewise appear to hold that at some point, a use in fiction rises to
the level of a real-world use in commerce. But at what point is a
use in fiction sufficient to break the fictional mark through the
fourth wall and into our world?
In answering this question, an analogy to virtual worlds is
instructive. In online games such as Second Life, players
experience a virtual community through their avatars.250 They can
purchase any number of goods in this community with virtual
“Linden Dollars,” which can be purchased with real dollars. A
number of goods which can be purchased in Second Life are
simply virtual versions of real-world goods: Nike sneakers and the

246

Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
See, e.g., DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“Kryptonite . . . serves to identify the entertainment and other goods and services
created, distributed and/or licensed by or on behalf of DC Comics.”) (emphasis added).
248
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
249
DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
250
SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
247
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like. But some goods are created expressly for Second Life and
sold only in the game. The appropriation of such goods by other
virtual vendors has lead to real-life litigation resulting in several
cases of real-life protection for these virtual trademarks.251
Writing on the use of trademarks in these virtual worlds,
Professors Candidus Dougherty and Greg Lastowka analyze the
issue of whether a use in this world is a use in ours.252 Because
“[m]any Second Life users are playing for real money profit,”253
they argue, “a Second Life user who regularly conducts in-world
sales under a recognized brand should meet the use threshold
required to establish trademark rights.”254 However, they exclude
“a hobby-use, a de minimis use . . . a handful of sales or an internal
business use” from the list of uses sufficient to establish trademark
rights.255
Fictional trademarks are a closer case. Like a virtual trademark
in Second Life, Duff Beer is a fictional mark being used in a
virtual world. Unlike the virtual world of Second Life, however,
Springfield is non-interactive and the individual elements of that
world are not separately monetized. Thus, unlike in Second Life,
where the number of sales generated and the revenue earned by the
creator of a virtual trademark are easily calculated, it is unclear to
what extent the creators of The Simpsons owe their financial
success to Duff. Thus, the conventional use in commerce
analysis—scrutinizing The Simpsons’ overall sales or ratings—
does not provide the full picture of Fox’s use of Duff, specifically.

251

See, e.g., Eros LLC v. Leatherwood, No. 8:07-CV-01158-SCB-TEW (M.D. Fla.
filed July 3, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/
2008-03-20-Order%20for%20Judgment%20by%20Consent.pdf (enjoining defendant
from selling unauthorized copies of “sex bed” for use in Second Life); Eros LLC v.
Simon, No. 1:07-cv-04447-SLT-JMA (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2008-01-03-Judgment%20by%20
Consent%20as%20to%20Simon.pdf (settlement for unauthorized copying of virtual sex
toys for use in Second Life).
252
Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749 (2008).
253
Id. at 779.
254
Id. at 782.
255
Id.
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In the fictional trademark context, then, this Note proposes that
courts more broadly analyze the efforts expended by the creator of
a fictional mark to link the mark and the associated entertainment
product in the public mind.256 Certainly the market penetration
and popularity of the larger entertainment work—elements
measured by the conventional use in commerce analysis—provide
circumstantial evidence of the efforts of the mark’s creator to forge
an association. Indeed, these indicia constitute essential factors in
calculating use and represent an important limiting principle. This
is so because the author of a fictional work will seldom register a
fictional mark, and indeed, will likely not be permitted to do so by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office absent immediate
plans to use the mark in commerce, such as by licensing it.257
Accordingly, to function as a real-world mark, a fictional
trademark must be associated with an entertainment work which
has achieved “substantial sales.”258 The Kryptonite court seems to
have assumed this when it noted with approval that the fictional
element Kryptonite had “come to be recognized as a powerful
symbol” for the Superman franchise, “[a]s a result of broad
dissemination throughout all media.”259 Conversely, minimal
distribution of the entertainment work in which the fictional mark
is embedded (what this Note will call the “container entertainment
work”) might implicate the Zazu court’s concern that rival firms

256

Importantly, the fictional trademark plaintiff’s efforts in this regard operate in
precisely the same way as do those of a conventional trademark plaintiff seeking to forge
an association between her product and her trade symbol. Indeed, the conventional use in
commerce analysis is essentially a proxy for the more difficult task of assaying
consumers’ associations. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Thus, calculating
use in commerce by measuring the fictional trademark proprietor’s attempts to link the
mark and the associated entertainment work poses a new analytical model, but breaks no
legal ground. See DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff DC Comics’ use of the prominent
fictional element “Kryptonite” in DC’s Superman comic books, motion pictures and
television programs amounted to use only as a story element or character and not as a
“trademark use” protectable under the Lanham Act).
257
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
258
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
259
Kryptonite, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
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receive fair notice that a mark is already associated with a
competitor’s brand.260
To complete the picture of whether a plaintiff has made
substantial efforts to link the fictional mark and the container
entertainment work in the public mind, the prominence of the
fictional mark within the work must also be measured. Here,
courts should apply copyright’s filtration test to determine if the
mark is a sufficiently prominent and well-defined element of the
fictional atmosphere, or mere scenes-à-faire. The proposed
trademark priority analysis is thus both quantitative and
qualitative. A mark must be sufficiently pervasive throughout the
container entertainment work that it could reasonably come to
stand for the work in the public mind. By measuring sales of the
container entertainment work and the pervasiveness of the mark
within that work together, this quantitative analysis serves as a
proxy for the quantitative “active use” in commerce inquiry
performed at the priority step under the conventional trademark
analysis.261 Unlike in the conventional use in commerce inquiry,
however, a fictional mark must also have achieved some minimal
level of literary distinctiveness (the “slight amount” of creativity
required by the Supreme Court in Feist) as to be capable of
becoming uniquely associated with the container entertainment
work. The distinctiveness inquiry at the priority step is not a
substitute for the more fine-grained analysis the court will perform
at the likelihood of confusion stage; at the priority step, the court
does not evaluate the strength of the mark and does not assess
actual confusion. Rather, by examining whether the fictional mark
is potentially memorable enough to serve as shorthand for the
entertainment work, this prong of the test simply ensures that the
fictional trademark proprietor was the first to use the mark as a
mark.
Courts should also note whether the mark appears in licensing
agreements: either as a real-world manifestation of its fictional
260
Zazu, 979 F.2d at 503 (“By insisting that firms use marks to obtain rights in them,
the law prevents entrepreneurs from reserving brand names in order to make their rivals’
marketing more costly. Public sales let others know that they should not invest resources
to develop a mark similar to one already used in the trade.”).
261
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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existence or simply depicted on T-shirts, etc. While licensing
agreements were present in both Powers and South Australian,
their existence should function as a one-way ratchet. That is, the
presence of a licensing agreement involving the fictional mark
should be strong prima facie evidence of a plaintiff’s efforts to
reserve priority in the mark, but the absence of such an agreement,
standing alone, should not be viewed as outcome determinative.
Additionally, courts should determine whether the fictional mark
appears in any advertising such as promotions for the
entertainment work on television or movie posters or in derivative
works such as The Simpsons comic book series.
The court should then proceed to the traditional multi-factor
“likelihood of confusion” analysis. Most courts’ first factor,
strength of the mark, poses difficulties in the fictional trademark
context because while “Bass” is distinctive on shoes, for example,
but “leather” is not, nearly anything will seem fanciful when used
on an entertainment product. Courts should thus evaluate the
distinctiveness of a fictional mark by again using copyright’s
filtration test because this test roughly maps onto the traditional
distinctiveness framework for conventional trademarks. That is,
while conventional trademarks are arrayed on a spectrum from
unprotectable and generic to fanciful and distinctive, fictional
marks derive their distinctiveness not by their relationship to the
products to which they are affixed but from the level of creativity
invested in them by their authors—a metric the filtration test was
designed to measure. The proposed strength of the mark analysis
should be a thorough, probing inquiry into the degree of creativity
invested in the fictional mark by its author. At this stage, courts
should note the degree to which the plot of the fictional work
features the mark, the detail with which the mark is rendered and
the actual memorability of the mark. To the extent that there is
any ambiguity in whether consumers have actually come to
associate the mark with the entertainment work, courts should
consider circumstantial evidence and, where available, empirical
evidence of actual confusion in the form of consumer surveys, just
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as they do under the conventional likelihood of confusion
analysis.262
Courts should understand the proximity of the goods factor as
how closely the real-world product mimics the fictional one. The
goods will never be proximate in the conventional sense because
the junior user is not selling entertainment, but rather, a tangible
product. This requirement should thus be understood not as
whether the products are the same, but as whether the defendant’s
product blurs the perspective between fantasy and reality, internal
and external, as Duff Beer and The Daily Planet do.
One last factor bears mentioning: the defendant’s intent in
selecting the mark. Courts should more readily infer bad faith on
the part of a defendant in this context than in the traditional
trademark framework. Here, the specter of trading on the fame
which is peculiarly associated with entertainment products hangs
over every case. Courts should have license to infer such bad faith
from circumstantial evidence. When, as in South Australian, the
senior user has “wide distribution” and “deep market penetration,”
this information should weigh heavily towards a finding of
malicious intent by a junior user just as copyright more readily
infers access when the original work is famous.263
This Note now analyzes Powers and South Australian under
the proposed framework and then considers other factual scenarios
involving fictional trademarks.

262
See, e.g., Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618
F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[s]urvey evidence may establish actual confusion”
and that “evidence of actual confusion can . . . support a finding of likelihood of
confusion” (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979)));
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 638–39 (6th Cir. 2002) (“If a party
chooses a mark with the intention of creating confusion between its products and those of
another company, that fact alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of confusing
similarity. Circumstantial evidence of copying, particularly the use of a contested mark
with knowledge of the protected mark at issue, is sufficient to support an inference of
intentional infringement where direct evidence is not available.”) (internal citations
omitted).
263
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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A. Rethinking Powers and South Australian Brewing Co.
Powers and South Australian were well reasoned and rightly
decided. However, the courts in those cases viewed an unusual
trademark problem through the lens of conventional trademark
reasoning and in so doing, were hamstrung in their attempts to
really explain the injury and why the remedy imposed was the
correct one. Under the tailored trademark analysis, Powers and
South Australian would come out the same way, but this
framework permits a court presented with those cases to address
the priority issue head-on, to articulate those factors going to the
distinctiveness of a fictional mark, and to more realistically assess
the likelihood of confusion when a fictional trademark is
appropriated.
1. South Australian Brewing Co.
Applying the fictional trademark framework to South
Australian Brewing Company, a court would begin with the
priority analysis. At this stage, it would proceed as the South
Australian court did. It would emphasize Fox and Groening’s
many attempts to link Duff Beer and The Simpsons in the public
imagination, such as “[l]icensed merchandise relating specifically
to ‘Duff Beer,’”264 and the evidence that Duff “appears in nearly
all episodes of the series”265 including two episodes “substantially
devoted” to the fictional beer: “Selma’s Choice” and “Duffless.”266
The court would explain that Duff Beer’s originality and
prominence on the show prevent it from being filtered away as
mere scenes-à-faire. It would also note at this stage The Simpsons
comic books, which feature Duff, as evidence of the fictional
mark’s presence across various media. These factors all point to
Fox and Groening’s having established priority in Duff. The South
Australian court reasoned by analogy to fictional characters to
make this point, citing an earlier case involving Mickey and
Minnie Mouse267 which held that these names were “so closely
264

See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451,
456 (Austl.).
265
Id. at 455.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 463 (quoting Radio Corp. Pty. v Disney [1937] 57 CLR 448, 453 (Austl.)).
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associated in the public mind, with . . . [Walt] Disney and his
activities” that the use of either the characters’ names or likenesses
in connection with goods would suggest that the goods were
“connected with . . . Disney.”268 Proceeding under this Note’s
approach, the court could instead simply hold that under the
totality of the circumstances, Fox and Groening’s efforts to forge
the link between its fictional mark, Duff, and its entertainment
property, The Simpsons in the public mind were substantial and
numerous. Accordingly, Duff Beer is a trademark for The
Simpsons and the plaintiffs had established priority in the mark.
In determining the likelihood of confusion, the court would
begin by focusing on the strength of the mark, applying
copyright’s abstraction test. Indeed, the South Australian court
essentially did so, without saying as much, and its approach is
instructive on this point. It emphasized the way the “‘makebelieve’ product” is “coupled with a character [Homer Simpson], a
background institution, (Duff Brewery), and also with the
associated advertising signs, posters and images of the beer, which
play an important role in the series.”269 The court noted Duff’s
role in the “fictional world which the characters inhabit”270 and
reasoned that, “[n]o doubt, the assignation of the name ‘Duff’ to
the product was likely designed to achieve a more believable
specific fictional effect than to have an anonymous generic
‘beer.’”271 In so doing, the South Australian court implied that
Duff’s distinctiveness owes to the literary definition given to the
fictional beer and the artistic originality it embodies, but proposes
no test for measuring such distinctiveness.272 An “anonymous
generic ‘beer’” could not realistically come to stand for the show
in the public mind. Accordingly, copyright’s filtration test would
render it unprotectable scenes-à-faire. But a court would almost
certainly find that because Duff embodies a high degree of original
268

Id.
Id. at 465–66.
270
Id. at 466.
271
Id.
272
Interestingly, the South Australian court also performed a traditional distinctiveness
analysis. Concluding that “‘Duff’ cannot be said to be descriptive of the beer’s qualities”
id. at 463 it nevertheless determined that Duff had “acquired a powerful secondary
meaning.” Id. at 465.
269
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expression, it is indeed a memorable and distinct aspect of The
Simpsons and therefore functions as a highly distinctive trademark
for the show.
Under proximity of the goods, courts compare the fictional
product to its real-world counterpart. In South Australian, the
trade dress of the real-world beer was “said to be quite different
from that featured [on] ‘The Simpsons.”273 Nevertheless, South
Australian Brewing Company’s product was a beer bearing the
name “Duff.” Thus, while South Australian Brewing Company’s
“Duff” is not a real-world replica of The Simpsons’ Duff, the beer
does blur the perspective between fiction and reality to some
degree. The goods are therefore somewhat related under this
factor.
Finally, the South Australian court notes The Simpsons’ “wide
coverage, deep market penetration and broad recognition”274 to
suggest that Fox and Groening had established substantial good
will in The Simpsons and in the fictional mark.275 The proposed
framework, however, permits a double inference from The
Simpsons’ market position: the existence of good will built up in
the mark by Fox and an intent to trade on that good will by the
breweries. This factor, too, strongly suggests infringement.
2. DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers
Similarly, in DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, the court began by
shoehorning the fictional newspaper in with the Superman
characters. The court pointed to the existence of licensing
agreements for “all the Superman characters” which led to the
creation of merchandise featuring the fictional newspaper.276 The
Powers court essentially reasoned that The Daily Planet functioned
as a protectable character just as Superman did, and was licensed
and promoted accordingly.
Under the proposed approach,
however, the court would not have had to reason by analogy or
bootstrap the fictional newspaper to the Superman characters. It

273
274
275
276

Id. at 471.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 456.
DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 465 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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could simply state that The Daily Planet is a prominent and welldelineated ingredient of DC’s protectable entertainment work,
Superman, and DC has made substantial efforts to link the fictional
newspaper and the Superman franchise in the public mind. It
would then marshal the evidence of the licensing agreements and
would note that The Daily Planet is a well-defined newspaper,
playing a central role in the series. Not only does the paper have a
recognizable title, masthead, and office building, but it employs
nearly all the characters in the series, including the Man of Steel
himself (incognito as his handsome, but bumbling alter ego, Clark
Kent), Superman’s love interest Lois Lane, and a photographer
named Jimmy Olsen whose interest in Lane forms a love triangle
in the series.277 Based on its dramatic role in the Superman series,
The Daily Planet thus survives even a very stringent filtration
analysis. The court would then conclude that based on the totality
of the circumstances, DC Comics had established The Daily Planet
as a protectable trademark and having used the mark in commerce,
had reserved priority rights in it.
The court would then proceed to the likelihood of confusion
analysis. Under strength of the mark, a court would likely find that
the level of distinctiveness of The Daily Planet is high, owing not
to the uniqueness of the name as applied to a newspaper (which
under the conventional trademark analysis would likely be found
to be on the borderline between a descriptive and a suggestive
mark, and thus possibly unprotectable absent secondary meaning)
but rather, to the fictional newspaper’s dramatic role in the series.
Indeed, it is precisely because The Daily Planet calls to mind the
Superman characters and story, and not that it is a particularly
unusual name for a newspaper, that it serves as a potent trademark
for the series.
Under proximity of the goods, the court would note that
Powers’ Daily Planet employed “a masthead which was an exact
replica of the Daily Planet insignia appearing in numerous

277

See generally Superman Episode Guide (1968), THE BIG CARTOON DATABASE,
http://www.bcdb.com/cartoons/Filmation_Associates/A-G/Batman_Superman_Hour/
Superman (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
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Superman comic books.”278 This factor cuts strongly in favor of a
finding of infringement.
When discussing the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark,
the Powers court’s reasoning is instructive. Noting the appearance
of drawings of Superman and the use of the Superman character in
its articles, including one titled “Superman smokes super dope”279
the court found Powers’ adoption of the name The Daily Planet to
be “merely an attempt to cash in on the Superman story and its
notoriety.”280 Indeed, as Powers himself admitted in his affidavit
“that he was aware of the relationship between the Daily Planet
and the Superman story when he first decided to use the name,” the
Powers court rightly identified the link between bad faith in
selecting the name The Daily Planet and the fame of the Superman
story.281 A court applying the proposed framework would proceed
in the same manner at this step.
B. Notes on Tailored Trademark from Other Factual Scenarios
This Note now briefly considers a few other fictional
trademark scenarios which illustrate the proposed framework
applied in practice.
Perhaps the best weapon in the war against fictional trademark
infringement is the licensing agreement. In the race to bring
fictional products to real-world markets, no licensing company
rivals Omni Consumer Products Corporation.282 Named for the
“fictional megacorporation” from the film, “Robocop,”283 this
“defictionalizing company” enjoys licenses to produce real-world
versions of Tru Blood, the fictional blood substitute for vampires
from the HBO television series of the same name;284 Sex Panther,
the fictional cologne from the 2004 Will Ferrell film, Anchorman:
the Legend of Ron Burgundy; and Stay Puft marshmallows, whose
278

Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 849.
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
OMNI CONSUMER PRODS. CORP., http://www.omniconsumerproductscorporation.com
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
283
Rob Walker, This Joke’s for You, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/05/04/magazine/04wwln-consumed-t.html.
284
Mercifully, the real-world version is a blood orange soda.
279
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fictional spokesman, the Stay Puft Marshmallow Man, famously
wreaks havoc in midtown Manhattan in the climax of the 1984
film, Ghostbusters.285 Each of these products is, of course,
perfectly legal and produced pursuant to a licensing agreement.
But assuming for a moment that such products were produced
without a license, an analysis of the fictional trademarks upon
which they are based illuminates how a court might apply the
tailored trademark framework proposed in this Note under related,
but distinct factual scenarios.
Firstly, it would be hard to imagine a more successful effort to
reserve priority in a fictional mark than that made by HBO in its
use of Tru Blood. In addition to being the title of the container
entertainment work, True Blood, the fictional product Tru Blood
plays a pervasive dramatic role in the series; indeed, in the series, it
represents a technological breakthrough which permits vampires to
live in (tenuous) harmony with the living. Vampires are depicted
chugging this fictional product out of a stout glass bottle with a
recognizable red and yellow logo in nearly every episode of the
show.286 Accordingly, Tru Blood sails through the priority
analysis because of the creativity invested in it by the show’s
creators (it is the lynchpin of the plot of the entire series) and its
pervasiveness on the series. However, both factors do not
necessarily need to be present in equal amounts for a fictional
trademark proprietor to succeed in linking its fictional mark and
the entertainment work in which it is embedded.
In Anchorman: The Legend of Ron Burgundy,287 Paul Rudd’s
caddish, mustachioed television reporter, Brian Fantana, hatches a
scheme to woo a female television anchor with the help of a
fictional cologne called “Sex Panther.”288 In the movie, the
fictional cologne is “illegal in nine countries,” (presumably
because it is “made with bits of real panther”) and has been
subjected to studies which indicate that “60% of the time, it works

285

OMNI CONSUMER PRODS. CORP., supra note 282.
See generally HBO, TRUE BLOOD, http://www.hbo.com/true-blood/index.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2010).
287
ANCHORMAN: THE LEGEND OF RON BURGUNDY (Dreamworks Pictures 2004).
288
Id.

286
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every time.”289 The absurdity of the fictional cologne, as well as
the scene in which Fantana’s scheme predictably flops, manifests a
high degree of creativity and causes Sex Panther to serve as a
potent trademark for Anchorman despite its only appearing in a
few brief minutes of the film. The success of the licensed, realworld version of Sex Panther provides strong circumstantial
evidence that consumers do, in fact, associate Sex Panther with
Anchorman and that its caché among consumers is predicated
almost entirely upon this association. Indeed, as the South
Australian court noted with regard to the fictional Duff, “it would
be artificial in the extreme to suggest that consumers would be
attracted by the concept of [Sex Panther] on the basis of its
dictionary meaning” alone.290 Accordingly, at the priority step,
pervasiveness and distinctiveness should be understood to exist on
a sliding scale, such that a plaintiff could succeed in establishing
priority with a high degree of either or a modest amount of both.
Finally, while Stay Puft marshmallows have yet to be released,
their success in the marketplace would give courts another metric
by which to evaluate a fictional trademark proprietor’s success in
transforming a fictional product into a real-world trademark:
duration of the association. It has been twenty-six years since the
Ghostbusters’ showdown with the Stay Puft Marshmallow Man.291
The success of defictionalized Stay Puft marshmallows a quarter
century later would represent strong circumstantial evidence of the
strength of the mark.
Yet another instructive example of a fictional trademark
creator’s efforts to encourage the public to associate a fictional
mark with a real-world entertainment product is Dunder Mifflin,
the fictional paper company of NBC’s television show The Office.
The fictional Dunder Mifflin maintains a real-world Internet
presence292 with an elaborate website announcing fictional

289

Id.
See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451,
465 (Austl.).
291
GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984).
292
DUNDER MIFFLIN, A MICRO-CAP REGIONAL PAPER AND OFFICE SUPPLY DISTRIBUTOR,
http://www.dundermifflin.com (last visited May 28, 2010).
290
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corporate environmental initiatives,293 and the company’s fictional
acquisition by another fictional company, Sabre Corp.294 The site
also features a complete archive of (hilarious) fictional company
newsletters.295 The site is so richly detailed that one could spend
hours on it before getting linked back into its web host, nbc.com.
In this way, the website stealthily advertises for the show while
masquerading as the public profile of Dunder Mifflin. In other
words, it pulls the user into the internal perspective of The Office
where Dunder Mifflin is real and marvelously mediocre. NBC
thus uses Dunder Mifflin in at least two ways to reserve priority in
the mark: as the fictional workplace around which the plot of The
Office centers—much like the way The Daily Planet functions in
Superman—and in real-world, on-line advertising for the show.296
Its perspective-warping website would also weigh heavily in
NBC’s favor in an infringement suit under the “proximity of the
goods” factor because the more a company pulls us into its
fictional world with a fictional trademark, the more likely any
second-comer’s goods are to create marketplace confusion.
Another interesting “proximity” issue is raised by use of a
fictional trademark on real-world goods which are not exact
analogues of their fictional counterparts. In DC Comics v.
Kryptonite Corp., DC Comics sued defendant Kryptonite Corp., a
manufacturer of bicycle locks which had licensed the name of the
fictional element from DC, when Kryptonite went beyond the
bounds of the licensing agreement.297 Kryptonite was, of course,
not manufacturing a green, glowing space mineral, but earthly
security devices. While this fact cuts in favor of Kryptonite under
the “proximity of the goods factor,” it is important to recognize
that, in fictional trademark cases, the goods are almost never

293
Id. (“Dunder Mifflin is committed to improving the environment. That’s why we
plant a tree for each and every metric ton of paper that we ship.”).
294
SABRE CORP., http://www.sabre-corp.com/news-012010.shtml (last visited May 28,
2010).
295
Contact, DUNDER MIFFLIN, A MICRO-CAP REGIONAL PAPER AND OFFICE SUPPLY
DISTRIBUTOR, http://www.dundermifflin.com/contact (last visited May 28, 2010).
296
That the site also sells licensed Office merchandise further strengthens NBC’s claim
of priority under the framework proposed in this Note.
297
See DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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proximate in the traditional trademark sense.298 Thus, the kind of
“nonparallel” use at issue in Kryptonite represents merely a
difference of degree, but not of kind, from the more typical realproduct-that-appears-to-be-the-fictional-product injury.
CONCLUSION
Homer Simpson is not just a guy and Moe’s Tavern is not just
a bar. These represent valuable intellectual property assets which
in many ways serve as conventional trademarks. A fictional
trademark functions no differently than a fictional character in
terms of its ability to designate the source of an entertainment
product, but because it appears to be a trademark for a fictional
good, rather than the entertainment work in which it is embedded,
it blurs our perspective and our ability to understand its ontological
function.
This Note locates fictional trademark injuries under trademark
law but proposes adapting the trademark framework to the
particulars of the fictional trademark problem. This tailored
trademark framework borrows analytical principles from copyright
to determine what a use in commerce sufficient to reserve priority
in a mark might look like for a fictional trademark, and to
determine if a fictional trademark has been infringed. Conceiving
of fictional trademarks as real-world trademarks for their
associated entertainment products and modifying the trademark
analysis to evaluate the strength of those trademarks will help
protect valuable intellectual property rights in these entertainment
products.

298

Filmation proved the rare exception. There, DC Comics used its characters as
trademarks for its entertainment products: the shows Aquaman and Plastic Man, which
defendant Filmation’s entertainment products, the shows Manta and Moray and
Superstretch, were found to infringe. DC Comics, Inc., v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F.
Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See infra Part I.A.

